The typical French listed company exhibits a concentrated ownership structure with the largest shareholder typically holding more voting rights than cash flow rights. This paper studies the acquisitions made by French listed firms over the period 2000 through 2009 and investigates how such ownership characteristics affect acquirer abnormal returns and acquisition activity. Abnormal returns around acquisitions are decreasing as the wedge between voting and cash flow rights increases. This result suggests that controlling shareholders use corporate acquisitions as a means of extracting private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. The well-documented valuation discount associated with the divergence between voting and cash flow rights could be explained by less efficient acquisitions. The paper also shows that firms whose largest shareholder holds significant excess control rights are less likely to engage in M&A activity. This last finding raises the issue of sample selection bias, which has not been taken into account in earlier studies.
Introduction
Ownership structure acts as an internal governance mechanism. Large shareholders are likely to play an important role in exercising corporate governance as their ownership stakes provide them with the incentives to collect information, scrutinize manager actions and oppose value-destroying decisions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003) .
Recent studies emphasize the prevalence of concentrated ownership structures around the world, this being especially true for East Asia (Claessens et al., 2000) or Continental Europe (Faccio and Lang, 2002) but also in the United States, despite the conventional wisdom suggesting that the typical U.S. public firm has diffuse ownership (Holderness, 2009) .
Although being associated with numerous advantages (all shareholders will benefit from the monitoring effort made by a large blockholder), concentrated ownership might generate severe agency costs. A controlling shareholder has the power to influence corporate decisions and is in a position to enjoy private benefits which, by definition, are not shared with other (minority) shareholders. These private benefits can take numerous forms: tunneling of resources out of firms (Johnson et al., 2000) , nepotism or the prestige and social status derived from the control of a well-known company.
1
When making a corporate decision, the controlling shareholder faces a trade-off between (1) private benefits she will solely enjoy and (2) the change in her net wealth induced by the evolution of firm value. For instance, the controlling shareholder is likely to give consent to an investment with negative present value if the benefits she derives outweigh the incurred loss induced by the stock price decrease.
As emphasized by Bebchuk et al. (2000) and Morck et al. (2005) , agency conflicts between large and minority shareholders are magnified when the largest shareholder owns control (i.e. voting) rights which strongly exceed her fraction of the equity claims on a company cash flows. Such a separation of ownership and control can be realized through control enhancing mechanisms like pyramids, dual-class shares and cross-holding ties. The above mentioned studies demonstrate that controlling owners often lock control over their companies through these control enhancing mechanisms. Of all the 464 European companies 1 There is no precise definition of the true nature of private benefits of control. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 312) evoke the benefits associated with the owner-manager status: " […] pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities such as the physical appointments of the office, the attractiveness of the office staff, the level of employee discipline, the kind and amount of charitable contributions, personal relations ("friendship," "respect," and so on) with employees, a larger than optimal computer to play with, or purchase of production inputs from friends".
analyzed in a study commissioned by the European commission, 44% feature at least one control enhancing mechanism (ISS, Sherman and Sterling, ECGI, 2007) .
This raises the question of the costs and subsequent loss of social welfare associated with a separation of ownership from control. Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003) empirically demonstrate that firm valuation is lower when the control rights of the largest owner strongly diverge from her cash-flow rights. Confirming these results, Guedhami and Misra (2009) show that equity financing is more expensive for firms whose controlling shareholder holds excess control rights. These studies support the agency hypothesis that large shareholders extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. However, an important question is (partially) left unanswered in earlier studies: what exactly are the channels through which such extraction occurs? In other words, what are the corporate decisions that a controlling shareholder influences in order to advance her own interests?
In this paper, the focus is on corporate acquisitions. They have long been recognized as crucial events that are potentially associated with the consumption of perks or private benefits. Owner-managers may be prone to invest excess cash-flows in corporate acquisitions that maximize their own utility rather than firm value (Jensen, 1986) and entrench themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) . The consequences of (bad) corporate acquisitions are of significant economic importance: Moeller at al. (2005) demonstrate that, over the period 1998 through 2001, acquiring-firm shareholders lost around announcement 12 cents per dollar spent on acquisition. To the extent that acquisitions of other companies are among the most important decisions a firm has to make, one could expect conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders to be extremely severe during acquisition periods.
The link between ownership structure and corporate acquisitions has received some attention in financial literature. Ben-Amar and André (2006) study a sample of Canadian bidders and observe a non linear relationship between the largest shareholder stake and announcement-period abnormal returns; howewer they do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact. The distinctive feature of my paper is its focus on France, a country whose institutional framework and ownership characteristics strongly differ from those analyzed in earlier studies. French firms typically have a concentrated ownership and a controlling shareholder who holds control rights which exceed her cash-flow rights. In the majority of the cases, this high discrepancy comes from the typical French system of double voting rights (Burkart and Lee, 2008) . Furthermore, the protection of minority investors under French law is weak (La Porta et al., 1998) . Thus, there is scope for severe conflicts between large and minority shareholders.
To carry out my analysis, I collected relevant data pertaining to ownership structure for SBF250 firms.
2 Due to changes in the composition of this index, my initial sample contains 400 unique firms. I then construct a sample of 660 acquisitions that were announced by these firms over the decade from 2000 to 2009. An important characteristic of this paper is that it relies (1) on an acquisition sample (that is to say a sample of firms which actually announce an acquisition) and (2) on a larger sample of listed companies, with only some participating in the M&A market as bidders. The 660 acquisitions were in fact initiated by 196 companies, which demonstrate that approximately one half of SBF250 companies did not announce a takeover bid over a 10-year period. In contrast to earlier studies, my methodology allows me to control for a potential selection bias that derives from the fact that the choice of bidding is not random.
I observe a negative and significant relationship between excess control rights and abnormal returns around acquisition announcements. This result shows that acquisitions initiated by firms whose largest shareholder holds excess control rights are detrimental to firm value and suggests that corporate acquisitions are a means of private benefits extraction at the expense of minority shareholders. I also investigate whether other large shareholders play a monitoring role. These blockholders are associated with higher value losses and thus do not appear as credible safeguards. Interestingly, further empirical tests do not validate the hypothesis of collusion between these blockholders and the largest one.
In a second line of analysis, I examine the acquisition behavior of French listed companies. It clearly appears that entrenched owners are very cautious toward acquisitions.
One possible explanation is that they fear the dilution of their power that could be induced by a stock-financed deal. My acquisition sample is hence biased toward firms with a lower separation of ownership and control. After controlling for sample selection bias, the main findings hold.
Finally, I try to control for endogeneity issues that inevitably arise in corporate governance studies dedicated to the ownership -performance relationship (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . I use the instrumental variables technique, which leads me to propose different variables that can influence the separation of ownership and control without directly influencing the performance measured by announcement-period abnormal returns. I discuss the relevance of this methodology which confirms previous findings.
This paper is related to the literature that seeks to understand why excess control is associated with a valuation discount. Masulis et al. (2009) examine a sample of U.S. dualclass companies and show that abnormal returns around acquisition announcements are decreasing as the insider control rights -cash flow rights divergence becomes larger.
As suggested by these authors, further international inquiry is needed in order to extend understanding of private benefits extraction through other control enhancing mechanisms that are not (or rarely) encountered in the United States. This paper fills that gap by showing that voting arrangements at the company level significantly harm firm performance. Furthermore, there is no evidence of lower abnormal returns for acquisitions announced by firms controlled via pyramid structures, which is consistent with empirical studies (Villalonga and Amit, 2009) and theoretical models (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008 ) that provide rationale for pyramidal ownership.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the French framework and reviews the literature dedicated to the relationship between ownership and acquisitions. Section 3 deals with the methodology, the sample selection and the construction of variables that are likely to play a role in explaining acquisition quality and why some firms engage in acquisitions. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 reports results from robustness checks aimed at testing whether results are still valid on subsamples, correcting selection bias and controlling for endogeneity. Section 6 concludes.
Background

The French case
A recent study commissioned by the European commission (ISS, Sherman and Sterling, ECGI, 2007) describes the availability of control enhancing mechanisms in Europe. In every country, external mechanisms (pyramids and cross-shareholdings) are encountered. In France, multiple voting shares (in a special form, see below), non-voting shares and non-voting preference shares can be observed. From the sample of French civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998) , France is the only one in which these three mechanisms are authorized.
In the vast majority of French listed companies, the deviation from the one share-one vote principle is realized through double voting rights shares (Burkart and Lee, 2008 Dual-class structures are rarely observed in French listed companies. As in Italy (see Zingales, 1994) , the only authorized mechanism consists of non-voting shares (which cannot account for more than 25% of existing equities).
My focus on French companies is also motivated by the specificities of the legal and institutional framework. Johnson et al. (2000) document anecdotal evidence of tunneling in a French firm. In an attempt to assess the size of private benefits of control, Nenova (2003) considers that controlling shareholders appropriate 27% of the value of the company in France. La Porta et al. (1998) compute the "antidirector rights index" which is equal to 5 for the USA and only 3 for France; Djankov et al. (2008) develop the "anti self-dealing index" whose value is 0.65 for the USA and 0.38 for France. From these measures, the level of protection afforded to investors in France seems to be weak. As ownership concentration and legal investor protection are often viewed as substitutes (see for instance Denis and McConnel, 2003) , the high ownership concentration observed in French firms is not surprising (only 14% of French listed companies are widely held at the 20% threshold according to Faccio and Lang, 2002) . In this context, Boubaker (2007) find results that are consistent with those observed in earlier studies: a high separation of ownership and control is associated with lower firm value.
Some authors argue that extralegal institutions may discourage predatory behavior by controlling shareholders. Dyck and Zingales (2004) claim that product market competition, public opinion pressure, moral norms, unions and tax enforcement may play an important role in curbing private benefits. The question of whether France offers such extra-legal institutions arises. Dyck and Zingales (2004) propose six different numerical proxies aimed at capturing the quality of extra-legal institutions and France is on the average. Stulz and Williamson (2003) consider that religion is a good proxy for cultural norms and show that religions are associated with significant differences in shareholders rights. In particular, Catholic countries (as France) protect the rights of creditors less well.
In sum, France is characterized by weak corporate governance at the firm level and by a legal and institutional framework which does not offer strong protection against minority expropriation. Extra-legal institutions do not appear as a credible counterforce. Consequently, the conflict of interests between controlling and minority shareholders may be extremely severe in French listed companies and there may be scope for private benefits extraction through different channels. This paper tests whether corporate acquisitions are one of them.
Ownership-control discrepancy and acquirer returns
The conflict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders may be extremely severe during acquisitions as the former may use the transaction as a channel of private benefit extraction at the expense of the latter. Some papers focus on intra-group transactions and hence test the tunneling hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, it may be beneficial for the ultimate owner of a pyramidal business group to favor intragroup transactions so as to transfer wealth to the upper level at the expense of minority shareholders at lower levels.
Studying a sample of Indian companies, Bertrand et al. (2002) document evidence of tunneling. In the Korean framework, Bae et al. (2002) show that an acquisition made by a chaebol-affiliated firm is value-destroying but that the controlling shareholder benefits from it as an increase of the stock prices of other firms in the business group is observed. However, Buysschaert et al. (2004) and Faccio and Stolin (2006) Amihud and Lev (1981) : the average number of acquisitions is higher for manager-controlled than for owner-controlled companies.
4 Dyck and Zingales (2004) indeed observe that the amount of private benefits dramatically dropped after the adoption of this reform (also known as the Draghi reform). 
Number of unique firms (quoted as component of the SBF250 index) 400
Potential number of firm-years (10 years from 1999 to 2008) 4,000
Number of excluded observations (delisting…) -805
Observations with unavailable accounting/financial data -56
Observations with unavailable ownership data -61
Exclusion of outliers -15
Final number of observations 3,063
Acquisition data
This paper investigates the likelihood that a given firm announces an acquisition.
Therefore, I match the database presented above with the SDC database. I extract all the deals which meet the following criteria:
-The announcement date is between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2009.
-The acquirer is a French listed company -The deal value reported in the SDC database is 5 million Euros or higher. This methodological choice leads to the exclusion of trivial operations.
-The bidder is seeking to acquire at least 25% of the target's shares -The acquiring company owns less than 50% of the target's shares prior to the announcement and seeks to own more than 50% after the transaction. Hence, the focus is on deals that imply a real change of control.
The SDC database reports 821 deals which meet these criteria. I exclude deals initiated by firms which are not in the SBF250 Index (128), I then exclude 5 deals because bidder's financial statements for the fiscal year end preceding the announcement are not available in Worldscope. Market and share price returns are extracted from Datastream. As part of this paper relies on the event-study methodology, a minimum of 210 listing days before the announcement date is needed. Some observations must be excluded, due to an IPO which is too close to the announcement (28 observations). At the end, the final sample contains 660
observations.
No restriction is imposed on the bid's outcome. One could argue that deals referred as "completed" are more likely to be associated with higher announcement-period abnormal returns, which could lead to a selection bias. I hence choose to include completed but also unsuccessful and withdrawn deals in my sample (in line with Faccio and Masulis, 2005) . As a robustness check (see below), I replicate the empirical analysis on the sample of completed deal. This does not change the results.
Variables
Dependant variables
In order to capture the bidder announcement effect, I use the classical event-study methodology developed by Ball and Brown (1968) and discussed by Brown and Warner (1980) . In the empirical analysis dedicated to the propensity to engage in acquisitions, the dependant variable y it (with i indicating the company and t the year) takes the value of one whether the firm launches a bid in year t+1 and 0 otherwise. The total value of deals announced in year t+1 divided by firm's market capitalization at the end of year t is another metric taken into account.
Predictor variables: ownership characteristics
In order to capture the incentive effect induced by a large ownership stake, the ultimate cash-flow rights (S1 UCF) of the largest owner are included. Some authors (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990 among others) argue that the relationship between this latter variable and firm performance is non linear which leads me to include a squared term (S1 UCF^2). In studies dedicated to corporate acquisitions, a non monotonic relationship is observed by Hubbard and Palia (1995) who notice that announcement-period abnormal returns are first increasing and then decreasing in insider ownership.
In order to measure the separation of ownership and control, I use two different measures:
the first one (WEDGE) is computed as a difference, the second one (WEDGE RATIO) is measured as the ratio of ultimate cash-flow rights over ultimate voting rights. These two measures are employed by Claessens et al. (2002) and Ben-Amar and André (2006) respectively. It should be mentioned that the expected signs of the coefficients are different: if the entrenchment hypothesis is true, a negative (positive) association between WEDGE (WEDGE RATIO) and acquisition announcement CARs is expected. I compute a dummy variable (HIGH WEDGE) which takes the value of one when the variable WEDGE RATIO is inferior to its median value. Thus, this variable takes the value of one when the separation of ownership and control is high.
An historical pattern of French capitalism is the prevalence of family ownership (Murphy, 2005) . As previous studies demonstrate that family firms are superior performers (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
Analysis of bidder abnormal returns: control variables
The industry relatedness of the deal is stored in a dummy variable (DIVER) which takes the value of one when the bidder and the target do not have the same 2-digit SIC code. Morck et al. (1990) observe lower returns for bidders which launch diversifying acquisitions.
I also control for cross-border transactions with a dummy variable (CROSS-BORDER) which is equal to one whether target's and bidder's nations differ. Using a sample of acquisitions made by US firms, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) demonstrate that bidder announcement returns are lower for non domestic than for domestic acquisitions.
The method of payment is stored in a dummy variable (CASH) which takes a value of one whether the acquisition is entirely financed with cash or equivalents). Travlos (1987) shows that cash-financed deals generate higher announcement abnormal returns.
A dummy variable (PUBLIC) takes the value of one when the target is a publicly traded company: examining a sample of U.S. bidders, Chang (1998) shows that bidder abnormal returns are higher when the target is privately held. This result appears to be universal as 
Analysis of the propensity to engage in acquisitions: control variables
Faccio and Masulis (2005) and the logarithm of the book value of assets are included as additional control variables.
One of the main motivations of managers who choose to list abroad is a better access to funds (Bancel and Mittoo, 2001) (Boubaker, 2007) . This could be due to widely-held firms:
they are largely represented in my sample of French bidders (23% of the sample) whereas such firms weight approximately 9% of the SBF250 index (Belot, 2010) . It is worth noting that other blockholders own on average 9.5% of the voting rights, a relatively high stake which could provide them with the incentives to scrutinize the decisions of the largest shareholder. The table also confirms the widespread use of double voting rights (in 65% of bidding firms) and pyramidal structures (21% of the acquirers).
[ INSERT 
Multivariate analysis
In In regression (1) and (2), the separation of ownership and control is measured with the difference between ultimate voting and cash-flow rights whereas a ratio is used in regression (3). A dummy variable which takes a value of one when the preceding ratio is under its median value is included in regression (4). In this last regression, the squared-value of ultimate cash-flow rights is included in order to control for a potential non-linear effect in the spirit of Morck et al. (1988) . It should be noted that the inclusion of this squared value does not modify the results (the coefficient on HIGH WEDGE is negative and significant at the 5% threshold if the variable S1 UCF^2 is not included in the regression).
The regressions demonstrate that firms exhibiting a high separation of ownership and control earn lower announcement-period abnormal returns. This result supports the hypothesis of private benefits extraction through acquisitions. Large shareholders whose interests are not perfectly aligned with those of minority shareholders seem to be prone to engage in value destroying acquisitions. This result is consistent with that obtained by Bigelli and Mengoli (2004) for Italy but is at odds with previous studies: Holmén and Knopf (2004) (with a p-value of 0.012) in the second sample. In the last column of Table 3 , I try to analyse more precisely this last finding: among family-controlled firms, I differentiate between the firms that are run by a professional CEO (F_PRO, 144 observations) and those that are managed by the founder or a descendant (F_FAM, 127 observations). As mentioned above, an important private benefit that is enjoyed by controlling families is the ability to allot significant management positions to family members. The regression shows that the positive impact of family ownership is only attributable to family firms that are managed by a professional CEO, in other words firms in which the family seems to be reluctant to exploit her controlling situation. This result corroborates the study of Sraer and Thesmar (2007) who show that abnormal returns to long-run shareholders of acquirers are higher for family-firms that are managed by an outside CEO.
The role played by other blockholders
It is often argued that other blockholders (beyond the biggest shareholder) are likely to play a monitoring role. Laeven and Levine (2008) show that firms exhibiting a complex ownership structure (i.e. having at least two large shareholders, each of them holding at least 10% of the voting rights) have a higher valuation than firms with a single shareholder. This explanation is that other blockholders do not exert adequate monitoring effort; this could be due to a free-rider problem among large shareholders (Winton, 1993) . In this context, the presence of multiple blockholders is detrimental to firm value and performance as large blockholders reduce liquidity without offering any offsetting monitoring advantage (Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998) . 11 For a detailed description of shareholder agreements in French listed companies, see Belot (2010 In the second regression, I exclude the firms that are classified as widely-held (i.e. which do not have a controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights). Although being less significant than in the standard regression, the coefficient of the WEDGE variable is still negative.
Multivariate analysis
As mentioned above, some firms are very frequent acquirers and the time period between two deals is sometimes inferior to 200 days (i.e. the length of the time period over which the market model parameters of the event study are estimated). In order to circumvent the contamination effect, I exclude all the acquisitions made by firms which have already announced another deal during the estimation period. The third column of table 7 presents the results. I do not observe significant differences and the main result holds.
In regression (4), I use cumulative abnormal returns computed on a larger event-window (CAR(-2,+2)). This does not lead to significant changes. In unreported regressions, I notice that my results holds when the 7-day CAR (CAR(-3,+3)) are used as the dependant variable.
In regression (5) (6)).
In the last regression, the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is not significant at conventional threshold. Consequently, selection bias does not appear as a serious concern for my estimates. Furthermore, the results hold when financial companies are excluded.
The coefficient on INV MILLS is positive and marginally significant in the sixth column.
This suggests that it is important to control for sample selection bias. I observe that the coefficient on WEDGE RATIO is now significant at the 5% threshold; it also appears that the coefficient on LOG ASSETS is no longer significant. The interpretation of the results is the following: the empirical analysis demonstrates that firms with a high ownership/control discrepancy earn lower abnormal returns (Table 3) while being also less frequent bidders (see Table 6 ). In other words, such firms are under-represented in the acquisition sample and the negative impact of the difference between voting and cash-flow rights on CARs might be underestimated in standard OLS regressions. It also appears that the coefficient on the size variable is no longer significant, big firms being overrepresented in the acquisition sample and hence the coefficient on LOG ASSETS overestimated in OLS regressions linking size to abnormal returns.
Even if the coefficient on inverse Mills ratio (IMR) is only marginally significant, sample selection bias appears to be an important issue. I hence include IMR in all previous regressions, the results hold and the magnitude of coefficients on WEDGE or WEDGE RATIO is larger (results are available upon request). This studies advocates for sample selection corrections as the coefficients estimates of earlier studies might be biased: BenAmar and André (2006) do not find that separation of ownership and control has a negative impact on performance, this could be due to sample selection problems as bidders are not randomly selected from the entire population of listed companies. (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) . For instance, market capitalization is a potential determinant of corporate performance but might also explain the presence and size of a large blockholder (the wealth needed to hold a substantial stake in General Electric makes the presence of a large blockholder not likely). Furthermore, ownership characteristics are likely to be correlated with (omitted) factors that also affect performance: Demsetz and Lehn argue that a concentrated ownership structure is more likely to emerge when there is amenity potential associated with the control of the company. Such private benefits might affect both corporate performance and ownership characteristics: a large shareholder could indeed be willing to increase her voting rights while decreasing her cash-flow rights when the opportunities for private benefits extraction are greater. To sum up, endogeneity concerns make the interpretation of standard regressions difficult: ownership variables might indeed be correlated with the error terms and the coefficient estimates of single equation models of the effect of ownership structure on corporate performance might be severely biased.
Endogeneity
To mitigate such endogeneity problem, instrumental variables (IV) are commonly used in financial and accounting research. As emphasized by Angrist and Krueger (2001) , a valid instrument needs to fulfill two conditions: "a good instrument is correlated with the endogenous regressor for reasons the researcher can verify and explain, but uncorrelated with the outcome variable for reasons beyond its effect on the endogenous regressor". In this paper, the key variable of interest is the difference between voting and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder. I attempt to determine which variables meet the following criteria:
(1) they have a significant influence on the WEDGE variable and (2) The second variable I consider is aimed at capturing amenity potential of a firm's output.
In a study dedicated to dual-class companies in the U.S., Gompers et al. (2010) argue that the choice of the dual-class structure (and hence the choice of a high separation of ownership and control) is not random and driven by variables capturing various forms of private benefits.
One of the measures is the ratio of firm's sales to the sales of all firms in the same geographic region. The underlying reasoning is the following: there are private benefits (especially prestige and social status) associated with the fact of being a big employer and a well-know citizen of a local community. Roosenboom and Schramade (2006) show that owner-managers are more likely to lock control when the firm has its headquarters outside Paris, Lyon,
Marseille and Lille (the four biggest French cities). To compute my variable (PCT SALES), I
use the following procedure: I first extract (from the Worldscope database) the postal codes and sales of all French firms that have been listed over the years 1999-2008. 14 I then classify them according to the first two digits of this postal code which identify the "département"
where the firm has its headquarters. 15 In the acquisition sample, the average value of the PCT SALES variable is equal to 10.8% for firms having a high separation of ownership and 14 I do not require these firms to be components of the SBF250 index. I hence consider 1,245 unique French firms that have been listed for at least one year over the period 1999-2008. 15 There are 100 départements in France, this administrative zoning was drawn around 1800.
control (HIGH WEDGE=1) whereas being equal to 8.1% for other firms (nevertheless, the difference is only significant at the 15% threshold). In my opinion, there is no reason to suspect that corporate performance is related to the localization of the company's headquarters. For instance, one could difficultly argue that firms located in area X record better performance than those located in area Y: France is a well developed economy and public infrastructure are adequate for all geographic areas. One could also argue that controlling shareholder with high power and social prestige in a given geographic area may get favors from local politicians, which could have an impact on firm performance. This is however not a major issue: Faccio (2006) shows that only 2.19% of French firms are politically connected (the world average is equal to 2.68%); furthermore the performance of politically connected firms tends to be lower (Faccio, 2010) . I include the PCT SALES variable in my regressions and do not observe any significant impact on firm's performance as proxied by cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of an acquisition.
I use the standard two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology. In the first stage, I regress the endogenous right-hand side variable (WEDGE) on the set of chosen instruments. In the second stage, the predicted (instrumented) values of WEDGE are introduced in the baseline regressions. Table 8 presents the results of this empirical analysis. The first two columns report the results obtained on the whole acquisition sample, whereas regressions (3) and (4) are estimated with the deals that are not classified as completed in the SDC database.
Regression (5) is estimated using the sample of firms having at least one large shareholder, with a second stage dependant variable taking the value of one when cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date are negative.
16
First, it appears that the selected instrument have a strong influence in explaining the separation of ownership and control. Old firms and firms having a large economic importance in their geographic area are more likely to exhibit an important ownership/control discrepancy. The table shows that the new specifications do not significantly change the coefficient estimates of the control variables. It also appears that the coefficient on WEDGE is negative and significant in columns (2) to (4). It should be noted that the p-value associated to the instrumented regressor in regression (1) is equal to 12.8%. Regression (5) confirms previous findings: the probability of a negative market reaction to the announcement of an acquisition is increasing in the wedge between voting and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder. 16 As the dependant variable in the second stage is an indicator variable, I use the ivprobit command of STATA 10 to estimate regression (5).
Be that as it may, it should be mentioned that the identification of the right instrument is a difficult and risky task. Bennedsen and Nielsen (2010) discuss the quality of variables aimed at instrumenting ownership-control disproportionality. They conclude that they lack qualified instruments for an IV analysis. More generally, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) 
Endogeneity, part 2
One form of the endogeneity problem is reverse causality. If we assume that controlling shareholders (1) use acquisitions as means of extracting private benefits and (2) anticipate future acquisitions, they could be likely to modify their ownership (and control) stakes exante. The reasoning is the following: anticipating future bad acquisitions (i.e. with negative CARs), they could be tempted to increase their control rights (they can hence use these voting rights in order to favor the achievement of the deal) and reduce their cash-flow rights (in order to minimize the decrease in their net wealth induced by the value-destroying acquisition).
However, I do not find evidence of such an opportunistic behavior. Previous year ownership variables are available for 560 observations of my acquisition sample; the WEDGE variable is equal to 7.00% in year t and 7.03% in year t-1 (the difference is not significant, with a p-value of 0.90). To further address the reverse causality concern, I replace the annual values of S1
UCF and WEDGE in year t with their values in the first year the firm appears in my sample (following Masulis et al. [2009] who use such a specification). This additional test does not change the results.
Conclusion
This paper investigates an important financial decision, namely corporate acquisitions, and how the ownership structure of the firm affects (1) abnormal returns around announcement date and (2) the propensity to launch a takeover bid. The results clearly demonstrate that minority shareholders of firms whose largest shareholder holds excess control rights experience lower abnormal returns. This result is robust to sample selection bias that has not been taken into account in earlier studies.
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate on the one share-one vote principle. -5-7-8, 3661-3-9, 3674, 3812, 3823-5-6-7-9, 4899 or 7370-1-2-3-4-5-9 (Faccio and Masulis, 2005) (2), (3), (4), and (6) are Probit regressions whose dependant variable is equal to one whether the firm announces an acquisition in the following year. In column (5) are the results of a Tobit regression in which the dependant variable is equal to the ratio (total value of the deals announced in year t+1/market capitalization at the end of year t). In regression (6), firms classified as belonging to the banking or insurance sectors are excluded. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector (1-digit SIC code) dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported.
In parentheses are z-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (Huber/White). In regression (5), the tstatistics are in parentheses and are based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) . Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
(1) In regressions (4), (5), and (6) I use the sample of 660 mergers and acquisitions announced by 196 French companies over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] . In regression (1), the focus is on completed deals (the deals that are announced but not completed are excluded). In regression (2), firms which do not have at least one controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights are excluded. In regression (3), I exclude all the deals made by companies which announced another deal in the 210 preceding days. In regression (7), bidders classified as belonging to the financial sector (banks and insurance companies) are excluded. In regression (1), (2), (3), (6) and (7), the dependant variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)) while I use CAR(-2,+2) in regression (4). All regressions are OLS regressions except regression (5) which is a LOGIT specification. In this LOGIT model, the dependant variable takes the value of one whether the cumulative abnormal return computed over a 5-day period (CAR(-2,+2)) is negative. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector (1-digit SIC code) dummies are included in the regressions but are not reported. In regression (6) and (7), the inverse Mills' ratio (INV MILLS) computed with Probit estimates of Table 6 (from regressions (2) and (6) respectively) are included. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980) and acquirer clustering. In regression (5), the z-stats are in parentheses and are based on Huber/White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively. (4), the sample is restricted to the 555 acquisitions that are classified as "completed" in the SDC database. In regression (5), firms which do not have at least one controlling shareholder holding at least 10% of the voting rights are excluded. The variable treated as endogenous is WEDGE (the difference between voting and cash-flow rights of the largest shareholder), the instruments are YEARS IPO (number of years since first appearance of the company in Datastream) and PCT SALES (ratio of firm's sales to the sales of all firms in the same geographical area). For the first stage, I only report the coefficient estimates for the excluded instruments. In regression (1) and (3), the dependant variable is the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR(-1,+1)) while regressions (2) and (4) are estimated with CAR(-2,+2) as dependant variable. In regression (5), the dependant variable is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when CAR(-2,+2) is negative. Variable definitions are in Appendix B. Year and sector dummies (based on the 1-digit SIC code) are included in the regressions but are not reported. In parentheses are t-statistics based on standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**), or 10% (*) level, respectively.
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